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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
All determinative statutes were set forth in the Brief of
Appellant.
OVERVIEW
The legal principles relating to a governmental entity's duty
with respect to roads and streets are complex and a precise
identification of the issues is necessary.

For example, in this

case, the Plaintiff has alleged that Utah County failed to warn of
the dangerous Intersection.
Utah County counters this contention by arguing that it did
not have a duty to install warning signs.

Instead, Utah County

argues that its only duty is that once it decides to install
warning signs, it must do so in a non-negligent manner.

This is

based on this Court's holding in Jones v. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d
556 (Utah App. 1992), where this Court held:
Rather than placing a duty on municipality to erect
traffic control devices, the common law requires only
that once the municipality takes action to install such
devices, it must do so in a non-negligent manner.
Id. at 566.
However, these principles apply only to traffic control
devises at intersections. They do not state a municipality's duty
to warn.

The Supreme Court of Florida captured this essential

distinction in Department of Trans, v. Neilson, 419 So.2d 1071
(Fla. 1982).

There, the plaintiff's alleged that the State failed

to install traffic control devices at an intersection and failed to
1

warn. With respect to the duty to install traffic control devises,
the Supreme Court of Florida stated:
In our view, decisions relating to the installation of
appropriate traffic control methods and devices or the
establishment of speed limits are discretionary decisions
which implement the entity's police power and are
judgmental, planning level functions.
Id. at 1077. However, with respect to the duty to warn of the same
Intersection, the Supreme Court of Florida held:
The failure to so warn of a known danger is, in our view,
a negligent omission at the operational level of
government and cannot reasonably be argued to be within
the judgmental, planning-level sphere.
Clearly, this
type of failure may serve as the basis or an action
against the governmental entity.
Id. at 1078.
Utah County had discretion to install traffic control devices
at the intersection.
must warn.

But it did not have discretion to warn.

It

Plaintiff respectfully asserts that the distinction

between traffic control devices and warning signs is critical to
the resolution of this case.

Those authorities relating to the

duty to warn clearly indicate a duty on the part of Utah County to
warn of the dangerous Intersection.
ARGUMENT
I.
UTAH COUNTY HAD A COMMON LAW DUTY TO WARN MOTORISTS OF
THE DANGEROUS INTERSECTION,
Utah County argues that based on previous holdings of the Utah
Supreme Court and this Court, it had no duty to warn motorists
using 6000 West of the dangerous Intersection. Stevens v. Salt Lake
2

County. 478 P.2d 496 (Utah 1970); Jones v. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d
556 (Utah App. 1992). However, neither of these cases dealt with
the duty to warn motorists and, therefore, neither is applicable
here to shield Utah County from liability for its negligent
actions.
Stevens dealt with an intersection between a dirt path on a
vacant lot and a mainstream road. The plaintiff alleged that
motorists using the dirt path and motorists using the road could
not see each other in time to avoid accidents. The plaintiff in
Stevens was asking Salt Lake County to "correct" or "remedy" the
hazard. Stevens, 478 P.2d at 499. Utah County proceeds to argue
that because a county has no duty to correct visibility problems
between dirt paths and main roads, it has no duty to warn motorists
of dangerous conditions caused by the intersection between two main
roads.
The Plaintiff in this case has not asked Utah County to
"correct" or "remedy" the hazard. Instead, the Plaintiff has
alleged that Utah County should have "warned" of the hazard. The
Utah Supreme Court in Stevens never addressed the issue of warning
and therefore, that case cannot be used to support Utah County's
contention that it had no duty to warn of the site distance problem
at the Intersection.

3

Utah County also relies upon this Court's holding in Jones v.
Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992).

The holding of

Jones was that "[rjather than placing a duty on a municipality to
erect traffic control devices, the common law requires only that
once the municipality takes action to install such devices, it must
do so in a non-negligent manner." Jones, 834 P.2d at 560. Utah
County extrapolates this holding to suggest that it has no duty to
warn motorists of dangerous and defective conditions in its roads
unless it so chooses in the exercise of its "discretion." Jones
dealt with the narrow issue of whether a municipality had a duty to
place traffic control devices at an intersection. Jones did not
address the duty of a municipality to warn of dangerous conditions,
and, therefore, is inapplicable here.
Moreover, Utah County's interpretation is inconsistent with
the authorities used to support Jones. This Court relied upon
McQuillin and his statement that "a city is generally not liable
for failure to install traffic signs and signals." 19 Eugene
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 54.28b, at 90 (3d
ed. 1985) . However, this statements addressed only the duty to
place traffic control devices at intersections. Now let's see what
McQuillin had to say about the duty to warn, which is the subject
of this case:

4

The absence of a sufficient barrier, guard, railing,
light, sign, or the like in a public way, for the
protection of travelers using due care who are endangered
by the want of such precautions, constitutes a defect and
a want of repair. Accordingly, in addition to the duty to
repair, the duty of a municipality to use ordinary care
to keep its streets in condition for use includes the
duty,
where
there
are
dangerous
obstructions,
declivities, or excavations on or near the street,
whether created by the municipality itself or by third
persons, where it has notice thereof or notice is
unnecessary, to take proper precautions to guard against
accidents by the use of railings, barriers, lights, or
the like, especially at night.
18 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations. § 54.90a,
at pp. 334-35 (emphasis added). See also 39 Am.Jur.2d, Highways.
Streets,

and

Governmental

Bridges,
Duty

to

§

397

Provide

(1968);
Curve

Annotation,

Warnings

or

Highways;

Markings. 57

A.L.R.4th 342 (1987).
Utah County relies upon only selective portions of McQuillin
to support its argument. It ignores those sections which directly
relate to the duty to warn, sections which clearly indicate that
Utah County had a duty here to warn of the dangerous Intersection.
Utah County has not provided a single case which indicates
that a county has discretion to warn motorists. Stevens related to
the duty to a municipality

to

"correct" or

"remedy"

hazards

alongside the road. Jones dealt with the duty to erect traffic
control devices at an intersection. There is absolutely no support
for the contention that Utah County can choose to warn motorists of

5

dangerous and defective conditions in its roads and streets, or at
its option subject motorists to peril.
Utah County accuses Plaintiff of using the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985),
to support those sections of McQuillin's treatise up on which she
relies. The Utah Supreme Court stated in Richards that:
The duty of municipal corporations with respect to the
maintenance and repair of traffic signals in this state
is set out in 18 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal
Corporations § 53.42 (3d ed. 1984).
Id. at 278. Utah County seems to argue that Richards can only be
used as precedent to support Section 53.42. However, this Court in
Jones v. Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992), used the
very same language which Plaintiff used in her brief to support the
use of section 54.28 of McQuillin's treatise. Id. at 560 n.l.1 Utah
County has not been quick to attack the Jones case because it
desperately relies upon that case to support its position, but
attacks the Plaintiff for following the lead of this Court. Utah
County's argument that McQuillin is the law of Utah only when it
supports its position is misplaced, patently unfair, and should be
summarily rejected.
1

Utah County compares the quotation from Plaintiff's brief
with the quotation from Richards and suggests that Plaintiff
intentionally misquoted the language by deleting the section from
McQuillin referred to by the Court in Richards. However, this Court
in Jones quoted the Supreme Court in exactly the same manner as
Plaintiff did, also deleting the section number.
6

Utah County dismisses Bramel v. Utah State Road Comm'n. 465
P.2d 534 (Utah 1970), and Carroll v. State Road Comm'n. 496 P.2d
888 (Utah 1972), on the grounds that in both instances, the State
Road Commission had placed warning signs or barriers, but the means
of warning were deficient. Utah County then argues that in neither
case did the Utah Supreme Court hold that a municipality had a duty
to warn. But consider closely the language of Bramel:
The answer to the first proposition is to be found in
applying the test found so generally throughout the law
of torts, and which is also applicable here: Did the
defendant Road Commission discharge its duty of
exercising reasonable care under the circumstances by
placing adequate and appropriate warning signs for the
safety of traffic using the highway.
Bramel

v.

Utah

State

Road

Comm'n,

465

P.2d

534,

536

(Utah

1970) (emphasis added) . The Utah Supreme Court did not hold that the
Road

Commission

only

had

a

duty

of

"placing

adequate

and

appropriate" warning signs at its discretion. Instead, it held the
Road Commission had a duty to place warning signs. This was also
the conclusion reached by the Utah Supreme Court in Carroll v.
State Road Comm'n. 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972). Justice Ellett stated
the point most clearly, concurring in Carroll:
In this case there was no place for discretion to give or
not to give an adequate warning to the motoring public.
The duty on the part of the State to give and maintain a
reasonably adequate warning was absolute, and I am unable
to see where discretion is involved.

7

Carroll, 496 P.2d at 892 (J. Ellett, concurring)(emphasis added).
(The majority in Carroll also held that the decision as to how to
warn did not involve discretion.) These cases demonstrate that once
the duty to warn is addressed

instead of issues surrounding

intersections signs, Utah County's argument crumbles.
Utah County has never provided any public policy or other
rationale for its contention that it has discretion to warn
motorists of dangers on its roads.

Utah County concedes that it

has a duty to "maintain its county roads in a condition reasonably
safe for travel." Brief of Appellee, p. 11. However, Utah County
then proceeds to argue that it can, at its option, decide whether
it would like to fulfill that duty by warning people of dangers. In
other words, although 6000 West is not reasonably safe for travel
due to the perilous sight distance problem, Utah County argues that
it could chose whether or not to make the road reasonable safe for
travel.
This theory represents a radical departure from traditional
case law. Ordinarily, if one has a duty, he or she must take steps
to fulfill that duty or he or she will be found negligent. Utah
County wants a separate set of rules to be applied only to Utah
County. Under these rules, Utah County has a duty to maintain its
roads in a condition reasonably safe for travel, but can chose
whether or not it wants to take steps to fulfill that duty. If Utah
8

County chooses to fulfill the duty, all the better. However, if
Utah County decides at its option that it does not want to fulfill
the duty, then motorists are left without a remedy. Plaintiff has
been unable to find one single case which suggests that a tortfeasor has the option of choosing whether to fulfill a legal duty
clearly established.
There is a complete absence of support for Utah County's
contention

that

it

had

no

duty

to

warn

of

the

dangerous

Intersection. Every authority addressing the issue has held that
there is such a duty. The basis for these decisions is that a
county has a duty to maintain its streets and roads in a condition
reasonably safe for travel, and this duty cannot be fulfilled if
motorists are not warned of dangerous perils on the road. Utah
County

is

forced

to

use

cases

dealing

with

the

control

of

intersections to support its position. These cases should not take
precedence over the Utah Supreme Court's clearly stated principle
that counties must fulfill their duty to keep their roads in a
condition reasonably

safe for travel

"by placing adequate and

appropriate warning signs for the safety of traffic using the
highways." Bramel v. Utah State Road Comm'n, 465 P. 2d 534 (Utah
1970).

9

II.
UTAH CODE ANN. S 41-6-22 (1988) REQUIRED UTAH COUNTY TO
WARN OF THE DANGEROUS INTERSECTION.
Utah County argues that Plaintiff cannot assert Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-22 (1988) as a ground for relief because the issue was not
raised before the trial court. However, in Buehner Block Co. v. UWC
Associates. 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988), the appellants contended that
the appellee should not be allowed to raise on appeal that a
contractual provision applied because the matter was not raised
before the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court held:
Appellants rely upon Banaerter v. Poulton in support of
their argument that Home is precluded from claiming for
the first time on appeal that paragraph 9 did not impose
a bonding requirement on the bank. But application of
this principle in no sense forecloses application of all
other rules of appellate review. One such principle is
that we may affirm trial court decisions on any proper
ground(s), despite the trial court having assigned
another reason for its ruling. In this case, we view the
trial court as having erred in construing the parties1
agreement However, as explained below, we conclude that
paragraph 9 did not impose a duty on Home, and therefore
we affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of Home.
Id. at 894-95. The same case law which Utah County advances in
asking this Court to consider its causation and reasonableness
arguments also allows this Court to consider Utah Code Ann. § 41-622 (1988).
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-22 (1988) provides:
Local authorities, in their respective jurisdictions,
shall place and maintain official traffic-control devices
upon highways under their jurisdiction as they find
10

necessary to indicate and carry out the provisions of
this chapter or local traffic ordinances, or to regulate,
warn or guide traffic.
Id. Utah County naturally places total reliance on the "as they
find necessary" language. Plaintiff submits that this language does
not confer discretion upon the county to warn. Utah County has
still never explained why it has discretion to warn about dangerous
conditions which render its road and streets not reasonably safe
for travel. If there is a dangerous condition in the road, Utah
County must warn or correct the remedy. Utah County should not be
allowed to argue that it has an option to fulfill its legal duty of
maintaining its streets and roads in a condition reasonably safe
for travel.
III.
UTAH COUNTY'S OWN STANDARD REQUIRED IT TO WARN.
Utah County argues that Plaintiff should not be allowed to
argue that Utah County1s own standards required it to warn because
the argument was not presented to the trial court. This position is
inconsistent with the Utah Supreme Court's stated principles.
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988).
The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices which Utah
County has accepted as its standard mandates that

lf

[s]igns are

essential where special regulations apply at specific places or at
specific times only, or where hazards are not self-evident." Manual
11

on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, § 2A-1
(1988). There is no discretion to warn. Utah County has a duty to
warn anytime there is a condition which renders the road unsafe for
travel. This Manual certainly does not relieve Utah County of its
common law duty to warn.
IV.
UTAH COUNTY BREACHED ITS DUTY TO WARN IN THAT IT KNEW OR
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE HAZARD, BUT FAILED TO REMEDY IT
OR WARN MOTORISTS OF THE DANGEROUS INTERSECTION.
Utah Court argues that summary judgment is appropriate on the
issue of whether Utah County breached its duty of care. This Court
has set forth guiding principles

for the granting

of

summary

judgment in negligence cases. Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah,
780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah App. 1989). This Court has stated:
As
a
general
proposition,
summary
judgment
is
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its
merits, and should be employed "only in the most clear
cut case." . . . Of particular concern is the precept
that "[olrdinarilv, whether a defendant has breached the
required standard of care is a question of fact for the
jury."
. . . Accordingly,
summary
judgment
is
inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is
"fixed by law," and reasonable minds could reach but one
conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the
circumstances.
Id.

(emphasis

added) Utah

County

is not

entitled

to

summary

judgment on the grounds that it did not breach its duty owed to
Plaintiff.
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Utah County argues that its actions were reasonable as a
matter

of

law

because

it

did

not

know

of

the

dangerous

Intersection. This argument is based on two principles. First, Utah
County argues that it relied upon municipalities to insure that new
intersections are safely attached to county roads. Second, it
argues that it relied upon "accident reports, input from schools,
school

administrators,

bus

drivers,

police

officers,

Utah

Department of Transportation officials and municipalities" to
inform it of dangerous conditions on its roads.
The fundamental problem with this argument

is that the

municipalities, school administrators, bus drivers and Department
of Transportation officials are not responsible to insure 6000 West
is in a condition reasonably safe for travel. Utah County has that
duty. Utah County has not presented any case support for its
contention that it can delegate its duty to maintain its streets
and roads. The mere fact that these sources did not discover the
dangerous Intersection does not relieve Utah County of its duty.
Furthermore, only a jury can decide whether it was reasonable for
Utah County to rely upon these sources to fulfill its duty.
Moreover, it is axiomatic that this Court considers all the
evidence and inferences stemming therefrom

in the light most

favorable to the losing party, in this case Plaintiff. Wycalis v.
Guardian Title of Utah. 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah 1989). Here, the
13

evidence is that Utah County employed a full time road inspector
that inspects all roads each year. R.

520

(Affidavit of Paul

Hawker, f 5 ) . 11500 North was connected to 6000 West in the early
1980f s. R. 347. This accident occurred on January 18, 1990. R. 165.
Thus, Utah County's road inspector would have driven over this
portion

of

road

five

to

eight

times

prior

to

the

accident.

Moreover, Officer Kerry Evans testified:
The intersection at 6000 West 11500 North is a poorly
designed one in my opinion. The north bo[und] traffic and
the west bound traffic cannot see each other until the
No[rth] Bo[und] vehicle crests the hill. The absence of
ski marks of both vehicles in this accident shows this.
R. 597. A jury would not only be justified in finding that Utah
County should have known of this hazard, it might be unjustified in
finding otherwise. Summary judgment should not be granted on the
issue of whether Utah County breached its duty to Plaintiff.
V.
UTAH COUNTY BREACHED ITS DUTY BY FAILING TO CONDUCT A
TRAFFIC AND ENGINEERING STUDY PRIOR TO REDUCING THE SPEED
LIMIT ALONG 6000 WEST.
Plaintiff argued before the trial court that Utah County was
per se negligent

in that it failed to conduct a traffic and

engineering study prior to lowering the speed limit along 6000 West
from 55 miles per hour. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46
County details the argument which

(1988). Utah

led to this conclusion and

dismisses it as "rank speculation." Brief of Appellee, pp. 25-26.
14

The Utah Supreme Court has recently stated principles by which
an expert witness1s affidavit can be used to avoid summary
judgment. Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992); Nay v.
General Motors Corp.. 850 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1993). In Nav, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
In Butterfield. we held that an expert witness can defeat
summary judgment by expressing conclusions as to the
dispositive issues before the finder of fact and by
identifying the specific grounds upon which his or her
conclusions are based. Id. at 104. Only when the expert
states a conclusion without identifying supporting facts
will summary judgment be appropriate Here, the Nays1
expert witnesses met the Butterfield standard. Taken
together, their testimony establishes a complete,
specific theory of both defect and causation.
Nav. 850 P.2d at 1264.
Here, Plaintiff presented the testimony of C. Arthur Guerts,
who testified as follows:
7. I have concluded that under Utah Code Ann. § 41-646(2) (c) (1988), the prima facie speed limit under Utah
law for 6000 West from 11000 North until 11700 North
should be 55 miles per hour unless an "engineering and
traffic" study conducted by Utah County indicates that a
lower speed is reasonable and safe.
9. In my opinion, Utah County could lawfully alter the
speed limit on 6000 West from its statutory prima facie
speed only "on the basis of an engineering and traffic
investigation that the prima facie speed permitted under
this article is not reasonable and safe under the
conditions found to exist upon a highway or part of a
highway."
10. In my opinion, an "engineering and traffic
investigation" must include a study of the normal and
average speed of motorists using the road.
15

11. I have learned from my review of Utah County's
Answers to Interrogatories on this matter that Utah
County did not conduct a speed study or other engineering
and traffic investigation prior to lowering the speed
limit to 35 miles per hour on the portion of 6000 West
where 6000 West intersects with 11500 North.
12. I have personally examined the intersection at 6000
West and 11500 North in Utah County where the accident
occurred and, in connection with my examination of the
Intersection, I performed a traffic engineering study in
order to evaluate the safety of the intersection. In
performing my traffic engineering study, I determined
that the 85th percentile speed for vehicles traveling
north on 6000 West is 48.1 mph and the 85th percentile
speed for vehicles traveling south on 6000 West is 50.1
mph.
16. Thus, in my opinion, if Utah County had conducted a
proper engineering and traffic investigation prior to the
installation of the 35 miles per hour speed limit on 6000
West, it would have discovered that corrective measures
were needed to protect motorists using 6000 West from the
hazard which existed due to the limited sight distance at
the intersection of 6000 West and 11500 North.
R. 683 (Affidavit of C. Arthur Guerts, ff 7, 9-12, 16). Mr. Guerts'
testimony clearly establishes the link between Utah County's
failure to conduct a traffic and engineering

study and the

accident. Utah County is free to dispute these conclusions with
evidence, but the Utah Supreme Court's holdings prevent summary
judgment for Utah County. Indeed, Utah County has never presented
any evidence refuting the conclusions of Mr. Guerts. As such, there
is no genuine issue of material fact and before the trial court on
remand, Plaintiff is the party eligible for summary judgment.

16

VI.
UTAH COUNTY IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
ISSUE OF CAUSATION
Utah County argues that even assuming all other elements of
the

Plaintiff's

claim

are

established,

summary

judgment

is

appropriate because it did not cause the accident. The Utah Supreme
Court has stated that "[p]roximate cause is a factual issue that
generally cannot be resolved as a matter of law.. . . Because
proximate cause is an issue of fact, we refuse to take it from the
jury if there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could
infer causation." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P. 2d 97, 106 (Utah
1992); see also Nay v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1264
(Utah 1993)("causation issues are factual issues that generally
cannot be resolved as a matter of law.")
Utah

County

argues

that

it

implemented

the

"blind

intersection" sign which Plaintifffs expert witness, C. Arthur
Guerts, recommended, but this has failed to lower the speed of
vehicles using 6000 West. It follows, argues Utah County, that even
if the "blind intersection" sign had been in place at the time of
the accident, the vehicles would have been going too fast and the
accident still would have occurred.
However, Utah County has only told this Court half the story.
Mr. Guerts did testify that a "blind intersection" sign should be
installed. However, he also testified:
17

19. In my opinion, the "blind intersection" sign is
insufficient to protect motorists in that the blind
intersection sign is not effective in reducing the speed
of motorists travelling on 6000 West.
20. In my opinion, Utah County should have identified the
hazard associated with the intersection, provided
corrective solutions, monitored the corrective solutions
for effectiveness, and made necessary adjustments. These
could include the blind intersection sign that was
installed, "blind intersection" sign with flashers, or
intersection flashers, or relocate the intersection to
warn motorists using 6000 West of the intersection and
the need for a reduction in speed.
R. 683 (Affidavit of C. Arthur Guerts, ff 19-20).
Moreover, in his deposition, Mr. Guerts testified as follows:
Q. But what I mean, is you talked about signage. Are your
talking about something like a blind intersection sign,
or approaching blind intersection, or what?
A. The blind intersection, I don't recall having ever
seeing blind intersection as a sign in the MUTCD, but
there certainly are signs that indicate intersection
ahead, et cetera, and are applicable in this instance.
And if they prove not to be adequate, then signs
supplemented with flashers are a possibility, or a
flasher itself over the intersection, all of which are
corrective actions.
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether a sign warning
that you're approaching an intersection, or a sign
warning you're approaching an intersection with flashers,
or a flasher over the intersection, would have prevented
the accident that brings us here today?
A. There's no way of making an absolute determination on
that. Do I believe it would have? I believe that properly
evaluated, there would have been some corrective action
and there was a high probability that the accident would
have been prevented.
Q. Some corrective action
accident; is that correct?
18

would

have

avoided

the

A. Yes.
(Deposition of C. Arthur Guerts, pp 65-66)(emphasis added).
Mr. Guerts testified that if Utah County would have installed
a "blind intersection" sign or a sign with flashers, or placed
flashers over the Intersection, there was a high probability that
this would have avoided the accident. Utah County now argues that
it has installed the "blind intersection" sign and this has failed
to reduce speeds along 6000 West. This fact alone would not allow
this Court to assume that the other measures identified by Mr.
Guerts—blind intersection sign with flashers or flashers—also
would fail to reduce speeds along the road.
Once again, the Butterfield and Nay standards are applicable.
The fact that Mr. Guerts has identified measures which Utah County
should

have

implemented

and

that

these

measures

would

have

prevented the accident is sufficient to avoid summary judgment.
Moreover, Utah

County

should

be prevented

from claiming

that

nothing could reduce the speeds along 6000 West when it has merely
implemented the simplest of Mr. Guerts1 suggestions.
Finally,

it should

be

noted

that Utah

County

has

never

disputed that a "blind intersection" sign with flashers or flashers
above the intersection would have prevented the accident. Utah
County has not presented one affidavit placing these facts into
dispute. As such, these facts stand undisputed in favor of the
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Plaintiff. If anyone is entitled to summary judgment upon remand,
it is Plaintiff.
VII.
UTAH COUNTY IS NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT
Utah County^ final argument is that it is immune from suit
because: (1) it failed to inspect 6000 West; and (2) its reliance
on municipalities and others to insure the safety of its roads was
a discretionary act. Neither of these contentions have merit. It is
clear that Utah County has waived immunity because the failure to
warn constituted a "defective, unsafe or dangerous condition." Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-8

(1989).

Utah County argues that its true failure in this matter was
that

it failed to

inspect the road to discover the unsafe

condition, and therefore, immunity is retained under Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-10(1)(d)(1989). However, in order for immunity to be
retained, the injury must "arise out of" the failure to inspect.
Id. Here, the injury arose out of the failure to warn of the
dangerous Intersection, not the failure to inspect.
Like Highland City in the consolidated portion of this
appeal, Utah County readily concedes its negligence so long as it
is immune from such allegations. This case is similar to Ingram v.
Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987). There, the plaintiff
alleged that Salt Lake City negligently designed the placement of
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a water meter lid, for which there was no immunity. Salt Lake City
argued that it was really negligent in failing to inspect the water
meter lid after installation, for which immunity could be retained.
The Utah Supreme Court stated:
Salt Lake City attempts to distinguish Murray and Bowen
on the grounds that in the former, the plaintiff fell
into a hole on the sidewalk and in the latter, the city's
maintenance of a city street was at issue, whereas here
the vault was not located on a public street. Both status
and case law hold otherwise, and the city may not rely on
section 63-30-10 (1) (d) of the Act to torture the facts of
this case into the provisions of that section.
Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
Here, Utah County failed to warn. This failure was the cause
of the Plaintiff's injuries. It should not be allowed to torture
the facts of this case to suggest that the injury "arises out of"
Utah County's failure to inspect.
The same arguments apply to Utah County's contentions that its
true failure was relying upon municipalities and others to discover
the hazard for it. As stated above, Utah County had a non-delegable
duty to insure its roads were in a condition reasonably safe for
travel. Utah County did not have discretion to rely upon these
entities. It had to take care of the roads itself.
Moreover,

the

Plaintiff

was

not

injured

when

the

municipalities failed to inform Utah County about the dangerous
Intersection. The Plaintiff was injured when Utah County failed to
warn motorists using 6000 West of the dangerous intersection. The
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injury "arises out of" this failure to warn and not out of any
action by those Utah County negligently relied upon to take care of
Utah County's roads.
Finally, Utah County argues that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8
(1989) does not apply to the instant case. That provision provides:
Immunity from suit for all governmental entities is
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or
dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, alley,
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or
other structure located thereon.
Id. Utah County argues that this provision would not apply to a
"complete failure to warn." Brief of Appellee, p. 30. Utah County
lists several cases which have applied Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8
(1989) , but it has not provided one case which deals with a
"complete failure to warn."
Utah County's position creates a curious result. After all,
Section 8 applies to a "defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition
of any highway" or other public structure. Utah County's argument
necessarily leads to the conclusion that a "complete failure to
warn" is not a "defective, unsafe or dangerous condition." Taken to
its extreme, if Utah County's road suddenly ends in a 200 foot drop
into a river, assuring death, Utah County would argue that this is
not a "defective, unsafe or dangerous" condition so long as Utah
County provides a "complete failure to warn". Plaintiff has no way
to respond to such a self-serving argument other than to suggest a
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"complete

failure

to

warn"

of

danger

must

be

considered

a

"defective, unsafe or dangerous condition." It is difficult to
imagine that the Legislature concluded that Section 8 would apply
to all dangers on a road with the exception of a "complete failure
to warn." One would expect that the Legislature would have at least
included such a broad departure from common sense in the statute.
Moreover, Utah County's cases cannot be reconciled with its
position. Utah County explains that if it placed a warning sign on
the road, but the sign was knocked down, such that there was a
"complete failure to warn," Section 8 would apply. However, if it
never placed a warning sign on the road, resulting in the very same
"complete failure to warn,"

Section 8 would not apply.

Utah

County has not explained why a "complete failure to warn" due to a
fallen sign is a "defective, unsafe or dangerous condition" but a
"complete failure to warn" due to Utah County's negligence is not.
Utah County's argument is ingenious and furthers its self-serving
purpose of retaining immunity. However, Section 8 includes all
"defective, unsafe or dangerous" conditions and thus, Utah County's
argument should be rejected.
Utah

County

also

relies

upon

two

cases

to

support

its

contentions. Valasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad, 469 P.2d 5 (Utah
1970); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 749 P.2d 660
(Utah App. 1988). Both of these cases deal with railroad crossings
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and the duty of a municipality to install traffic control devices.
Againf there is a vast difference between a duty to install traffic
control devices and a duty to warn. In the former, there is
discretion. In the latter, there is not. Thus, these cases which do
not deal with the duty to warn are simply inapplicable here and
should not be relied upon.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests
that the summary judgment entered

in favor of Utah County be

overturned, and this matter remanded for trial.
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